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THE CONTINUING QUESTION OF DELIVERY IN THE LAW
OF GIFTS
PATRICK J. RoHANt
In recent years the pace of change in private law subjects has been
barely perceptible when compared with the progression of rapid advance,
consolidation and branching off in new directions in evidence in the public law sphere. To some this may be an indication that the common law,
at least in many of its splintered components or categories of substantive
law, has matured beyond a growing stage and reached a plateau of reasonably satisfactory development, with concomitant loss of momentum
in the direction of change. However, most observers would probably
adopt the view that the press of problems directly concerned with the
community at large necessitates a concentration on public law measures,
with a moratorium on private law revision coming as an unintended
aftermath. This phenomenon in the legislatures is paralleled in the
courts, where, with the possible exception of negligence litigation, a
large portion of the docket is taken up with disputes governed wholly
or partially by public law, whether the measure be a tax statute, rent control, zoning or some other form or regulation. When there is legislative
or judicial alteration of outmoded concepts in the private law area, it is
likely to concern those aspects that affect so large a segment of the populace as to assume a public law character.' A ready illustration is found
in commercial law, where outdated rules are currently being supplanted
by the progressive provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. In
short, one might hazard the generalization that the likelihood of change
or development in any given area of law varies directly with the number
t Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; John Jay
Fellow, Columbia Law School 1962-63.
1. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150-51 (1921):
I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been
found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare,
there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment. We have
had to do this sometimes in the field of constitutional law. Perhaps we should
do so oftener in fields of private law where considerations of social utility are
not so aggressive and insistent.
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of persons affected by the particular norm under consideration. To this
may be added the corrective factor of the ability or inability of those so
affected to exert a collective influence on the law making body; if the
group is large but has no ready avenue of communication or vehicle for
banding together in concerted action, the factor of mere size diminishes
in importance.
That the foregoing observations are peculiarly applicable to the
property field may be seen in the fact that many of its present day principles have gone unexamined and unchanged for decades, and in some
cases centuries. The landlord and tenant relation alone could supply
countless examples ranging from archaic rules governing reletting after
the lessee's abandonment, to outmoded thinking on the effect of a consent to an initial assignment of a lease and the unrealistic approach to
the holdover tenant situation. The norms applied today in each of these
cases bear marked resemblance to those in force two and three centuries
ago and must be taken as an indication that these rules are deemed satisfactory, or that the necessary pressure in the direction of improvement
has been lacking, or perhaps that the judiciary has felt itself bound by
these principles solely because of their longevity and the assumption that
change must await legislative action. It is the object of this comment
to examine one such neglected principle, that of delivery in the law of
gifts, to determine whether the concept is still serviceable and, in so doing, to indicate that the judiciary has a particular responsibility for
periodic evaluation of common law concepts which are unlikely to be
drawn into the legislative grist mill for refurbishing. It is felt that this
responsibility weighs particularly heavy in areas where, as in landlord
and tenant and the law of gifts, the substantive law has been largely, if
not exclusively, shaped by decisional law.
THE PROBLEMATICAL DELIVERY

Although it would be a rare lawyer or law student indeed who could
not readily supply, on a moment's notice, the essentials for a valid giftthe familiar donative intent, delivery and acceptance-the difficulty
experienced in applying the formula seems to bear no relation to the ease
with which it may be stated. Situations involving shares of stock, bank
accounts, the contents of safe deposit boxes and other common gifts continue to find their way onto the dockets of the courts, including the
courts of last resort.2 Perhaps no other area of private law reflects so
2. See, e.g., Hill v. Bowen, 8 Ill. 2d 527, 134 N.E.2d 769 (1956), 1956 U. oF ILL. L.F.
513; Frey v. Wubbena, 32 Ill. App. 2d 374, 177 N.E.2d 724 (1961) ; Foster v. Reiss, 18
N.J. 41, 112 A.2d 553 (1955), 54 Mica. L. Rxv. 572 (1956), 17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 105
(1955) ; Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y2d 313, 178 N.E.2d 723 (1961) ; Matter of Szabo,
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large a number of defective transactions, split decisions and disappointing
results, both in isolated, individual cases and in certain recurring categories or factual patterns.' In possibly no other field is such a basic and
natural transaction governed almost entirely by abstract theory, having
remote, if any, connection with the desires or expectations of the participants. The uncertainty remaining, despite centuries of judicial experience with the law of gifts, is directly traceable to the troublesome
element of delivery, and reflects in large measure the fact that normal
growth of the traditionally flexible decisional law has been seriously
hampered by inertia, an undue concentration on formal requirements and
an inordinate fear of fraudulent claims. The comfortable, and usually
irrefutable, ratio decidendi provided by the donor's failure to literally
comply with the letter of the law has sapped the vigor from the approach
at both the trial and appellate levels. Largely neglected and unnoticed
have been the normally paramount considerations of enforcement of intention and the sanctioning of a decedent's plan for distribution of his
property. In the pages which follow, an attempt will be made to evaluate
the delivery concept through an examination of worthwhile theories previously advanced and an analysis of the social and other values involved.
At the outset one might question the need for a further discourse on
delivery in view of the economic unimportance of gifts and the availability of Professor Mechem's definitive articles on the subject.4 By
way of apologia, and in addition to the observations already made, it may
be stated that although the writer is in fundamental agreement with the
greater portion of what Professor Mechem has said, certain differences
in emphasis, if not in opinion, do exist. Moreover, the constant appearance of gift cases in the advance sheets indicates that the subject is
quantitatively important, measured by the number of cases arising annually rather than the amounts involved. Similarly, while some have
expressed the view that there is little by way of social or economic benefit to be gained in the use of judicial machinery to enforce donative
10 N.Y.2d 94, 176 N.E.2d 395 (1961). See also Smith v. Smith, 253 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.

1958), 61 W.

TA. L.

REv. 69 (1958).

3. Among the opinions which cut across individual cases and cause difficulty on
a continuing basis may be included those giving unsatisfactory treatment of the agency
determination in instances where the donor employs a third party intermediary, and
poorly conceived expositions relating to the prerequisites for use of the constructive
delivery doctrine.
4. Professor Mechem's thesis is found in the trilogy entitled The Requirement
of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial

Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 457, 568 (1926) [Hereinafter cited as Mechem]. See
also Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares, 20 ILL. L. REv. 9 (1925). Many of the
considerations urged in this comment have also been treated by Professor Mechem,
with some being endorsed, others rejected.
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transactions generally, much less imperfect gifts, it is felt that this is too
restricted a viewpoint and that recognized and accepted ends would be
subserved-by a consistent and well thought out policy in the gift area.
Although several authors have contributed varying analyses of delivery, most can be grouped under the heading of one of two schools of
thought. The first in point of time, the historical school, represented by
such scholars as Pollock and Maitland, have taken the position that the
requirement is but a remnant of a bygone day in which the seisin concept prevented recognition of even the sale of property, whether real or
personal, without a change of possession; an era when transfer of rights
in an object, as opposed to transfer of the object itself, could not be
envisaged. 5 As a corollary of the above it was pointed out that the
modern refinements of the constructive delivery doctrine were unthought
of in the thirteenth century, with delivery by means of a deed under seal
still a novelty in the fifteenth century.6 Of course an approach which
would explain the requirement exclusively in terms of historical accident
would not treat delivery as an indispensable element to be insisted upon
at all cost.
The second school of thought may be loosely termed the functional
school, including within it those who would approach the problem pragmatically. Under this view, delivery is explainable in terms of function,
that is, the valuable objectives which it accomplishes.' In rejecting the
position of the historical school almost in its entirety, the argument is
advanced that if delivery's chief justification lies in nothing but history,
it would have long ago ceased to be a requirement. Instead, its continued
vitality is attributed to several desiderata which are achieved by the prerequisite of delivery, perhaps without the courts being conscious of their
existence or of the role of delivery in securing them. Professor Mechem's classical analysis assigns three such ends to the "wrench" of delivery: it makes vivid and concrete to the donor the significance of the
act he is doing, it is unequivocal to the witnesses present, if any, and gives
the donee at least prima facie evidence in favor of the alleged gift.8
Gulliver and Tilson, in their extensive treatment of the subject, approach
5. See Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 L.Q. REv. 481 (1886); Pollock, Gifts
of Chattels Without Delivery, 6 L.Q. REv. 446 (1890); Stone, Delivery in Gifts of
PersonalProperty,20 COLUm. L. REv. 196 (1920).
6. See note 5 supra; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 180-83
(2d ed. 1898) ; 7 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 503-04 (2d ed. 1937).

7. See, e.g., Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 799 (1941)
[Hereinafter cited as Fuller] ; Gulliver & Tilson, Classificationof Gratuitous Transfers,
51 YALE LJ. 1 (1941) [Hereinafter cited as Gulliver & Tilson]; Stoljar, The Delivery
of Chattels, 21 MODERN L. REv. 27 (1958).
8. Mechem 354.
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delivery in much the same way, encompassing the objectives cited by
Mechem under the headings of the "ritual" and "evidentiary" functions,
while adding the "protective" or fraud prevention role.9 Professor
Fuller, in discussing the larger question of the need for legal formalities
generally, stresses these goals and adds the "channeling function of
form," which in the gift context is delivery, in that it offers a convenient
channel for the legally effective expression of (here donative) intent."0
In explaining delivery in utilitarian terms, these authors experience
little difficulty in reading in a dispensing power whenever the cited
desiderata are secured in any given factual pattern, despite the absence
of a delivery as traditionally defined. Thus, for example, Professor
Mechem would require a manual tradition or such facts and circumstances
by way of substitute as would secure the objectives outlined in his thesis.
He expresses the conviction that the existing case law supports such a
view in that many courts are presently implementing it by accepting substitutes for tradition which allegedly bring about a change of possession
or dominion and control, but which in reality merely satisfy the stated
functions.11 Gulliver and Tilson similarly insist that "an intended transfer should be sustained if the facts show substantial performance of the
ritual and evidentiary functions, whatever may be the particular method
of securing that performance."' 2 Professor Fuller, after cautioning that
legal formalities should be reserved for relatively important transactions,
takes the position that:
The need for investing a particular transaction with some legal formality will depend upon the extent to which the guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered superfluous
by forces native to the situation out of which the transaction
arises-including in these "forces" the habits and conceptions
of the transacting parties.'
As an illustration, he cites the relaxation of formal requirements in the
case of the donee already in possession of the res at the time the gift is
made. There a return of the property to the donor and subsequent redelivery to the donee are dispensed with, and mere words of present gift
suffice, due in large measure to satisfaction of the "cautionary" function
by the accompanying sense of present deprivation (which would not be
felt if the res were then in the donor's possession).
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Gulliver & Tilson 3-5.
Fuller 800-03.
Mechem 355.
Gulliver & Tilson 17.
Fuller 805.
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In analyzing the views set forth above, one finds that the functional and historical schools are in fundamental agreement on the fact
that manual tradition and possession should not be made ends in themselves. The two part company, however, on whether the requirement of
delivery presently accomplishes any worthwhile purpose. In studying
the position taken by the functional school, one finds that all three of the
expositions outlined above treat delivery as a meaningful formal, as opposed to substantive, requirement. All agree that a rational basis for
retention of, or insistence upon, delivery may be found in the safeguard
against enforcement of rash or impulsive promises of gift which it affords, and also in its evidentiary value to the donee, third party witnesses,
or both. At this juncture, however, the similarity ends. Gulliver and
Tilson are alone in stressing the fraud prevention or prophylactic role
as an independent function. Their over-all perspective also differs
markedly from the other authors cited in that they would regard the
formal requirement as meaningful only insofar as it assisted in securing
the primary goal of sanctioning the expressed intention of the property
Professor Fuller, on the other hand, is unique in citing the
owner.'
channeling function of form. He also aptly expresses certain substantive
deterrents to enforcement of promises-principally the cost of the social
effort thereby necessitated and the desirability of preserving an area of
"free-remaining relations" wherein preliminary and exploratory promises
continue to be unenforceable. 5 Although these substantive deterrents
were discussed largely in a contracts-consideration setting, they would
also appear to have some relevance in the delivery context, if only as
an enlargement upon the "cautionary" function.
14. Gulliver and Tilson make this their central theme, observing that:
One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the
individualistic institution of private property and granting to the owner the
power to determine his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the
courts should favor giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power. This
is commonplace enough, but it needs constant emphasis, for it may be obscured
or neglected in inordinate preoccupation with detail or dialectic. A court absorbed
in purely doctrinal arguments may lose sight of the important and desirable
objective of sanctioning what the transferor wanted to do, even though it is
convinced that he wanted to do it.
If this objective is primary, the requirements of execution, which concern
only the form of the transfer-what the transferor or others must do to make it
legally effective-seem justifiable only as implements for its accomplishment,
and should be so interpreted by the courts in these cases. They surely should
not be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality over frustrated intent.
Gulliver & Tilson 2-3.
Professor Mechem seems to be in disagreement in stating that frustrated intent
and individual hardship cases alone should not lead to a relaxation of the delivery
requirement. Mechem 350.
15. Fuller 813-15.
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TEE

DECISIONAL LAW

The reported decisions in the gift area have not emulated the somewhat abstract and theoretical approach of the functional school. Instead
the courts have centered their attention on the fact that delivery is a sine
qua non of long standing, with the principal, and often only, inquiry being whether or not the prerequisite has been satisfied in the particular
case under consideration. Overcrowded calendars, the elementary nature of the principles involved, the press of more urgent questions and
kindred factors may dictate such an approach. However, it appears
clear that archaic principles cannot go unexamined indefinitely and that
at some point a broader perspective must be employed. While the commentators have stressed the aspects of why delivery is currently required
and whether it should be continued as an operative principle, the courts
have adopted a one-sided inquiry. Despite this concentration, the acts
or group of acts which the courts will recognize as constituting an effective delivery continue to defy systematic classification and analysis.
Upon investigation, one finds that the earlier decisions insisted upon a
manual tradition of the object, resulting in transfer of possession and
dominion and control to the donee. However, special situations perennially arose which led to a tacit relaxation of the norm. Prominent
among these were gifts of choses in action, instances where the donee
was in joint possession with the donor, gifts from parent to child, as
well as donations involving such factors as bulky objects, property located at a distant place, and transfer of a key to a receptacle. 6 An examination of these cases reveals that the delivery requirement is not the
unitary, static norm that it is usually held out to be and that it cannot be
equated with manual tradition. As one author has observed:
The simple truth, then, is that the law is split into divergent and
disconnected rules. They are nominally kept together by some16. See the various exceptions to doctrinal delivery requirements set forth in
BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 41-46 (2d ed. 1955); Mechem, passim; Roberts, The
Arecessity of Delivery in Making Gifts, 32 W. VA. L. REV. 313 (1926); Sheller, Donatio
Mortis Causa, The Problem of Delivery, 33 AusmR. L.J. 387 (1960) ; Barlow, Gift Inter
Vivos of Chose in Possession by Delivery of a Key, 19 MODERN L. REv. 394 (1956).
The donation of a chose in action necessarily involves some element of substitution or
symbolic representation in view of the incorporeal nature of the property involved.
The case law has evidenced a tendency to follow the business practice of treating the
document representing the chose as if it were tangible personal property. Under accepted
doctrine, however, transfer of the instrument which controls enforcement of the chose
is essential; mere transfer of written evidence of the right will not suffice. Compare
Williston, Gifts of Rights Under Contracts in Writing By Delivery of the Writing,
40 YALE L.J. 1 (1930), with Bruton, The Requirenwnt of Delivery As Applied to Gifts
of Chioses in Action, 39 YALE L.J. 837 (1930). See Rundell, Gifts of Choses in Action,
27 YALE L.J. 643 (1918).
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thing called "delivery," though delivery which can be actual
delivery, semi-manual delivery, constructive delivery or no delivery at all. Is it not astonishing how unaxiomatic a legal
axiom can be?"
It has been demonstrated fairly conclusively that the various factual
patterns which currently satisfy the delivery standard in truth represent
multiple policy decisions. It has also been shown that the constructive
delivery cases do violence to any consistent theory based on transfer of
possession, and hence either must be regarded as exceptions to the requirement or the latter must be re-defined in other terms." If one seeks
to accentuate dominion and control in the donee as the real nub of delivery, greater consistency is achieved but many problems yet remain.
If, for example, delivery of a safe deposit box key or bank book is regarded as sufficient, the inability of the donee to gain access to the res
without judicial assistance, and the continuing ability of the donor to
reach the res without the key or bank book, are ignored. Similarly,
dominion and control would not appear to shift in other common situations, such as the informal writing or letter of gift cases, recognized as
effectual in many jurisdictions.
If the search for a workable lowest common denominator for delineating the legally effectual gift is carried below the criterions of transfer
of possession and transfer of dominion and control, two approaches suggest themselves. On the one hand, one may accept the possession or
dominion theory and append to it as many specific exceptions as might
be deemed worthwhile to recognize. This may be characterized as the
route currently being taken by most courts. On the other hand, one
might pursue the approach of the functional school in doing away with
the necessity for a delivery, or finding the necessary delivery to be present, in any case where certain desiderata are achieved without manual
tradition. The principal problems inherent in either of these approaches,
much more significant in the latter than in the former, are twofold: to
what extent would such a test bring about the enforceability of executory
promises of gift and to what extent would such a rule prove a workable
universal ?
In the eyes of some, a principal function of delivery is to separate
the unenforceable, executory promise of gift from a legally recognized
17. Stoljar, The Delivery of Chattels, 21 MODERN L. RIv. 27, 42 (1958). In a
similar vein, one author has expressed the view that the American courts have made
a point of insisting upon delivery, yet find that one has taken place in instances where
the English courts would not. See Bruton, supra note 16, at 853.
18. Mechem 356, 472-75.
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donation.' If delivery were to be downgraded or eliminated, what would
mark off the unenforceable promise, or more important, would all executory promises then become enforceable? The discussions attendant
abolition of the seal and suggestions relating to the elimination of consideration from the law of contracts have brought forth strongly held
viewpoints on the advisability of enforcing all promises indiscriminately."0
However, resolution of the question of enforcement of gratuitous
promises would not be a necessary corollary to a less stringent concept
of delivery. In the past delivery has been found where no delivery, as
currently defined, was present; the departure from the norm has been
clothed with respectability, and made more difficult to detect, by the use
of the constructive and/or symbolic labels. These inroads on delivery
have not brought about the wholesale enforcement of executory promises
of gift. And as long as a delivery standard required that an overt act
(such as writing) be shown, signifying the donor's intention that the
gift become presently effective, the factual pattern consisting of a mere
promise of gift would remain inchoate and nugatory.2
At first blush, a more imposing objection to relaxation of the delivery hurdle is presented by the argument that any norm based on an
ad hoc inquiry as to whether certain objectives have been realized or satisfied would, of necessity, require litigation in each and every case in
order to operate.22 With respect to the prognosis of litigation, however,
19. See Fuller 815; Stone, Delivery in Gifts of Personal Property, 20 CoLum. L.
REv. 196 (1920); Comment, Relaxation of the Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of
Personal Property,6 FORDHAm L. REv. 106 (1937).
20. See, e.g., POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 271-84 (1922);
1941 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65M, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LAW REvISION COMMIssIoN
TO THE LEGISLATURE RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN WRITTEN CONTRACTS

357; Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts,50 H~Av. L. REv. 449 (1937) ;
Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YtLE L.J. 704 (1931);
Lorenzen, Causa and Considerationin the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919) ;
Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Consideration to be Abolished from the Coinnon Law?,
49 HAzv. L. REv. 1225 (1936). With respect to the effect of legislation abolishing the
distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments on the question of whether a gift
can be effectuated by means of an informal writing, see BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
§ 46 (2d ed. 1955) ; Mechem 576-86.
21. The New York Court of Appeals adopted a somewhat similar approach in
constructing the "Totten Trust" doctrine, specifically in indicating that the tentative
trust could be made irrevocable by some unequivocal, overt act of the depositor. Matter
of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). It may be argued that the bank account
problem of the Totten case is sui generis or sufficiently confined to admit of the
approach there employed. However, there does not seem to be any reason why a similar
view may not be taken in any gift situation where an overt manifestation of intention
to make a present gift is proven.
22. It is not clear whether the approach of the functional writers previously discussed would be applied on a case by case basis, and thereby become subject to this
criticism, or whether the value judgment advocated would be made in advance and only
in the key fact patterns which recur over and over again. It is probable that the latter
interpretation is more in accord with the functional school's thinking on the matter and
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it should be noted that the existing confusion and uneven approach in
the gift area promote litigation, which, although successfully defended,
may drain the economic benefit from the gift. The uncertain and elusive demands of delivery make litigation by anyone with standing to
contest a worthwhile gamble, as does the fact that the suspicions of the
court, with respect to possible fraud and undue influence, are set in motion and to a degree confirmed by the very fact that a suit is commenced.
Relaxation and clarification of the delivery requirement would tend in
some degree to reduce litigation based on nothing more than a possibility
of success or eventual compromise. In addition, a reasonable degree of
stability would be achieved as soon as opinions were handed down endorsing the transition here contended for and extending to the gift area
the philosophy or approach prevailing in surrogate's matters generally.
NEGLECTED DESIDERATA

Although the reported opinions frequently declare that the law is
neutral and will not presume a gift or no gift, it does not take much
reading between the lines to appreciate that the courts generally look
upon gifts with disfavor, especially death-bed donations."
Much the
same is true of the expositions on the subject found in legal periodicals.
Perhaps the lack of a brief on the side of an even-handed approach to
gifts is partly responsible for their current posture. Initially, one might
query why one of the cardinal principles of the common law, the almost
reverential enforcement of intention, has not been made use of in the
gift area, not to enforce executory promises, but to weight the case
wherein the question of delivery hangs on nice distinctions.2 The pervading influence of this principle is seen in the widely accepted practice
hence this criticism is largely inapplicable to its adherents.
In response to the criticism in question, it should be noted that relatively few, if
any, legal concepts are so clear as to predetermine litigation by a mere inspection of
their requiremnts or phraseology. As Chief Justice Hughes noted in another connection:
It is apparent that there can be no precise delimitation of the transactions
embraced within the conception of transfers in "contemplation of death," as there
can be none in relation to fraud, undue influence, due process of law, or other
familiar concepts which are applicable to many varying circumstances. There
is no escape from the necessity of carefully scrutinizing the circumstances of
each case to detect the dominant motive of the donor in the light of his bodily
and mental condition ...
United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 119.
23. This is perhaps nowhere more quaintly stated than in Walsh v. Sexton, 55
Barb. 251 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1869), wherein Judge Peckham stated (of gifts causa mortis
effectuated by means of delivery of stock certificates alone) : "In my judgment, this
doctrine is fraught with the greatest dangers. It leads into temptation, from which we
all pray to be delivered, and it greatly facilitates frauds. The whole thing is wrong."
Id. at 256.
24. See note 14 supra.
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of construing a will wherever possible so as to avoid an illegal construction, thereby saving the testator's plan of distribution. A related phenomenon is operative in so construing a will as to avoid even partial
intestacy. By contrast, the courts receive the donor's intent, expressed
in the form of a gift as opposed to a devise or bequest, with less than
lukewarm enthusiasm, if not open hostility. The conclusion seems inescapable that such decisions rest on the belief that a thwarted gift involves at best a cure-all for fraud and at worst a return of the property
to the donor. However, such an assumption frequently includes within
it an oversimplification, since impending death usually supplies the occasion, as well as the motivation, for the donation.
Thus viewed, defeat of the transaction represents both rejection of
the donor's intention and a serious dislocation of his plan of devolution,
whether that plan took the form of a will or statutory distribution in
intestacy. In all prbability the donor had taken the purported gift into
consideration in determining what further dispositions would be made
on his death. Failure of the gift may accordingly result in a two hundred percent payment to one beneficiary at the expense of the doneebeneficiary receiving nothing; the likelihood of such an occurrence is
great where the latter is not a statutory distributee. The position of the
donee seems anomalous when one considers that the donor made a direct
overture to him while still alive, and is further illuminated by a comparison with the steps the law takes to secure equalization of shares, both
under the doctrine of advancements and under statutes aimed at deprivation through oversight, namely the enactments which give a prescribed
share to children born after the making of the will who are not otherwise
provided for. The disparity is further aggravated in the not unusual
situation where the donation is intended to satisfy an obligation owing,
in justice if not in law, to the donee.25 These few observations alone
indicate that a defeated gift may engender an irreparable imbalance in
one's testamentary scheme, with attendant family disharmony. They
would also appear to require a re-examination of the admitted judicial disdain of gifts and the resultant stress upon formal delivery requirements.
If the foregoing observations are valid, why, one might ask, has
insistence upon a literal delivery survived for centuries. One reason
may be found in the fact that there is no continuing group interested
enough, either as attorneys or as donees, to associate themselves with the
25. The donee appears to be the stepchild or forgotten man in the litigated gift
cases. By contrast, the Restatement of Torts has deemed the donee's expectancy, as
ephemeral as it is, worthy of protection, at least to the point of making unwarranted
interference with the expectancy actionable. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 870(b), illus. 2,
and 912(f) (1934).
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law of gifts to seek its refinement. Once a particular controversy has
been decided, the individual client goes his way, perhaps with misgivings
With respect to the law as applied to his case but with no burning desire
to rearrange things for the benefit of others yet to come. Of equal
importance, however, is the courts' oft recited fear of fraud," which is
usually coupled with analogies which liken the requirement of delivery
to the mandate of the statute of wills or statute of frauds.27 Finally,
there is the seldom expressed but widespread assumption that the lay26. The lack of flexibility often exhibited by the courts in interpreting and applying the delivery requirement is traceable in large measure to the fraud prevention
concern. The interaction of these two factors can be seen in the passages quoted below
which were directed to the gift causa mortis but are representative of the current
thinking on all death-bed gifts. The following comment of Judge Dixon, from his
opinion in Keepers v. Fidelity Title & Deposit Co., 56 NJ.L. 302, 28 AtI. 585 (E. & A.
1894), is typical:
We agree with the sentiment expressed in Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.Y. 572, 26
N.E. 627 [11 L.R.A. 684], that "public policy requires that the laws regulating
gifts causa mortis should not be extended, and that the range of such gifts should
not be enlarged." When it is remembered that these gifts come into question
only after death has closed the lips of the donor; that there is no legal limit to
the amount which may be disposed of by means of them; that millions of dollars'
worth of property is locked up in vaults, the keys of which are carried in the
owners' pockets; and that, under the rule applied in those cases, such wealth may
be transferred from the dying owner to his attendant, provided the latter will
take the key, and swear that it was delivered to him by the deceased for the
purpose of giving him the contents of the vaut,-the dangerous character of
the rule becomes conspicuous. Around every other disposition of the property
of the dead, the legislative power has thrown safeguards against fraud and
perjury; around this mode, the requirement of actual delivery is the only substantial protection, and the courts should not weaken it by permitting the
substitution of convenient and easily-proven devices.
Id. at 308, 28 AtI. at 587. A plea for an ad hoc approach to these cases is also indicative
of the phenomenon under discussion:
Expressions are sometimes found in the books to the effect that gifts causa
mortis are not favored in law because of the opportunity which they afford for
the perpetration of frauds upon the estates of deceased persons by means of
perjury and false swearing; but gifts of the character of those in question are
not to be held contrary to public policy, nor do they rest under the disfavor of the
law, when the facts are clearly and satisfactorily shown which make it appear
that they were freely and intelligently made. Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185.
While every case must be brought within the general rule upon the points essential
to such a gift, yet as the circumstances under which donations mortis causa are
made must of necessity be infinite in variety, each case must be determined upon
its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Dickeschild v. [Exchange] Bank,
28 W. Va. [3402, 341 ; Kiff v. Weaver, 94 N.C. 274. The rule requiring delivery,
either actual or symbolical must be maintained, but its application is to be
militated and applied according to the relative importance of the subject of the
gift and the condition of the donor. The intention of a donor in peril of death,
when clearly ascertained and fairly consummated within the meaning of wellestablished rules, is not to be thwarted by a narrow and illiberal construction of
what may have been intended for and deemed by him a sufficient delivery.
The rule which requires delivery of the subject of the gift is not to be enforced
arbitrarily.
Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321, 327, 24 N.E. 246, 248 (1890).
27. See the exhaustive citation of authorities in Chief Justice Vanderbilt's opinion
in Foster v. Reiss, 18 N.J. 41, 112 A.2d 553 (1955).
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man must strive to comply with the law at his peril; the law will not, or
at least should not, bend to meet the practices of the layman. Taking
each of these judicial objections in order, attention will first be directed
to the most frequently voiced, the possibility of fraudulent claims of gift.
While most commentators assign several functions to delivery, the
reported decisions evidence a singular preoccupation with a fear of fraud
in any case where a recognized delivery is not had. It may be seriously
questioned whether this emphasis is properly placed. If some of the instances in which the majority of courts find a delivery are examined, one
notes that the holdings provide no barrier at all to fraud, and some
might even venture to state that they facilitate fraud. Among the
chief offenders, of course, would be the situation wherein the alleged
donee was previously in sole or joint possession of the res and the delivery effectuated by means of a key. Perhaps more to the point is the
realization that these same courts will not uphold a gift in a case wherein fraud is ruled out but no traditional delivery has taken place. This
points up what is perhaps the tenor of judicial thought on the subject
at the present time, that is, delivery is a requirement which serves as a
guarantee against fraud, which must nevertheless be present although
the absence of fraud is secured by other means.
Where something less than a traditional delivery is had, but fraud
is not in issue, the courts often express sympathy for the donee while
alluding to the inexorable demands of the law. Would it not be more
advisable to fashion a concept of delivery which would not invalidate
proven and meritorious transactions unnecessarily, while at the same
time shifting the prophylactic function to the evidentiary area which is
more suited to the task of fraud prevention? The donee has the burden
of proving the alleged gift; if he carries that burden, there should be no
further need to question the genuineness of the gift. If the preponderance of the evidence alone is felt to be too low a barrier to spurious
claims in the death-bed gift area, a statutory or court made rule excluding or limiting the probative value of the donee's testimony concerning
transactions (including conversations) had with the deceased, might be
employed." Such an approach would rule out the donee as a key witness
in all but the rarest case and at the same time make his burden more
28. Such statutes, commonly referred to as the "dead man's statute," have been
enacted in several states. Eg., N.Y. Civ. PPac. AcT. § 347. With respect to the limitations which such a statute places on the donee's testimony, see Matter of the Estate of
Brown, 7 Misc. 2d 798, 167 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Surr. Ct. Kings Co. 1957) ; Matter of the Estate
of Housman, 182 App. Div. 37, 169 N.Y. Supp. 276 (2d Dept. 1918), aff'd, 224 N.Y. 525,
121 N.E. 357 (1918); Richardson v. Emmett, 61 App. Div. 205, 70 N.Y. Supp. 546

(1st Dept. 1901).
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difficult to carry. The fraud consideration might conceivably lead a
jurisdiction to thus require disinterested testimony to establish or coroborate the gift. Unlike arbitrary insistence upon a technical delivery,
however, such an approach would at least be directed to the source of
possible fraud and be further limited to deceased donor situations.29
Viewed affirmatively from the standpoint of the proof of genuineness
which is available to the court, much greater use could be made of such
factors as the physical and mental condition of the donor, the relationship
of the parties, the naturalness of the gift, the dispositive provisions of
the donor's will, the employment of an attorney in the matter, or lack
thereof, and similar probative facts and circumstances. A review of
the reported decisions rendered to date reveals that such details are seldom mentioned much less employed in the courts' rationale. In summary,
it is suggested that fraud can be coped with by other and more adequate
means than delivery and that a justification for an overly-strict application of the concept, if one exists, must be found elsewhere.
In a slightly different approach, several commentators and judicial
opinions advocating a strict application of the delivery concept have
placed reliance upon the statute of wills. The following passage from
Professor Mechem is representative:
An examination of the authorities shows that in the very great
majority of cases, the litigation occurs after the death of the
donor, even though the alleged gift was one technically inter
vivos. As far as evidentiary and other practical considerations
go, the attempted gift transaction thus becomes one substantially testamentary in nature. And it is to be observed that of
all statutory provisions controlling dispositions of property,
statutes of wills have been those least riddled by exceptions,
and those least the subject of hostile criticism."
Although the surrounding setting for the gift and the will are often
29. Another possibility, the employment of the "clear and convincing evidence"
test, or some variant thereof, although utilized in some states in deceased donor situations, has been vigorously criticized by several commentators in the field of evidence.
See, e.g., McCORMACK, EVIDENCE § 320 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
23 (1954); 9 WIaORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940); McBaine, Burden of Proof:
Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242 (1944). Needless to say, a jurisdiction making
concurrent use of both the dead man's statute and the clear and convincing standard
would have little justification for applying an overly-strict view of delivery as a fraud
preventive.
30. Mechem 350. However, Professor Mechem seems to alter his stand somewhat
at another point in his article wherein he states: "We have gifts causa mortis, for
better or for worse. If undesirable, the attempt should be to abolish them or set logical
restrictiohs on their operation, and not to 'bore from within,' to use the current expression, by arbitrary and carping exceptions." Id. at 574.
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similar, if not identical, this fact in and of itself provides no basis for
borrowing legal principles peculiar to the latter area. Attempts in this
direction are founded on the application by analogy of a statute which
clearly does not apply to the gift inter vivos and to which the gift causa
mortis constitutes an established exception. In jurisdictions in which
the theory of gifts causa mortis is that no interest passes to the donee
until the donor's death, the donation is for all intents and purposes
testamentary, whether delivery has taken place or not. In jurisdictions
in which a present interest passes subject to a right of revocation, the
transaction is more akin to an inter vivos gift, but again basically testamentary in operation. Thus the causa mortis gift, viewed in relation to
the statute of wills, stands or falls as an exception-its very definition
bespeaks the fact that an exception has been made. Accordingly, one
stressing the testamentary nature of such a gift is not raising a telling
defect but arguing against the advisability of making the exception."
The case for applying the statute of frauds is even more specious,
since there is no statutory mandate of general application requiring a
written instrument of gift. Moreover, the statute's purview is limited to
executory transactions while the question at issue is whether the particular gift was executed. The simple fact is that both inter vivos and
causa mortis transactions fall without the aforementioned statutes and
cannot be brought within their purview by any recognized rule of statutory interpretation, including the use of analogy. It would appear that,
as in the fraud prevention rationale, the comparisons employed offer
only a superficial justification for eroding the gift area from within
under the guise of strict construction of the delivery requirement.
A somewhat related question which must be answered in any discussion of relaxation of the delivery requirement is whether the law
should be modified to reflect the conceptions and practices of the layman
or whether the layman should be held to know the law, at least to the
extent of having his transactions rendered nugatory in any case where
previously established legal criteria have not been met. Tpyically those
advancing the latter position, in the context of the delivery question,
point out that as solemn an instrument as the decedent's last will and
testament falls where inadvertently, improperly executed. However,
this may well be a deceptive precedent to cite for several reasons. Of
primary importance is the more or less prevalent understanding among
laymen that a will is a legalistic transaction of such intricacy as to require a lawyer's services. Although this generalization may be difficult
31.

See the extensive exploration of this position in Costigan, Constructive Trusts,

28 H~av. L. REv. 237 (1915).
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to prove, the point to be noted is that, by contrast, except for instances
of tax-motivated giving, the layman would not even consider the thought
of hiring a lawyer to assist in making a gift. It is safe to say that the
public is aware of the fact that there are certain legal requirements for
a valid will, even if the specific prerequisites themselves are unknown
or misinterpreted, while it would be a truly rare individual who would
be equipped with the knowledge that there are case-law standards relating to the making of a gift. 2 Hence it would appear that the wills
area carries its own built-in safety device in that the common understanding flags the necessity for a trained attorney, while in the gift area the
common understanding is to the contrary. Similarly, the layman realizes
that he is exercising a dead hand insofar as his post-death directions are
to be carried out via a will and executor, whereas the gift situation has
all the surface earmarks of an inter vivos transaction. Even the individual who sets a gift causa mortis in motion in all likelihood does so
in complete ignorance of the name and attributes of the legal device he
is employing, regarding ownership of the object as having passed immediately to the donee, and relying solely on the honesty of the recipient
or on his own ability to retrieve the object, in the event of a recovery
from the illness at hand. The conditioning of complication-free seasonal giving and the appearance of a fully executed transaction also serve
to lull the layman into a false sense of security, preventing realization
of the fact that there may be outstanding legal requirements with which
he must comply. Another differentiating factor seldom noted is that
the testator can in a single stroke transmit real and personal property of
every kind and description, wherever located, by means of a single document, with no requirement that the assets be assembled and transmitted.
A gift of the very same assets, however, requires their collection and
manual tradition, or a recognized substitute for tradition. Thus the will
is, in a very real sense, a less complicated method of effectuating transfer
than is the gift.
In refutation of the above lines of reasoning, some have espoused
the view that the delivery concept does fit in with the layman's pattern
of action in that one naturally feels that a gift has not taken place until
the object is handed over to the donee. This position has often been
32. Mechem, Gifts of CorporationShares, 20 ILL. L. REv. 9, 9 (1925):
That the rule [of Irons v. Smallpiece] is psychologically unsound, if such expression be permissible, is suggested by the persistence with which litigants,
and even courts, have attempted to evade it. Judges have found themselves between Scylla of enforcing patently fraudulent claims, and the Charybdis of
doing intolerable hardship by refusing to enforce attempts at gift, made in
obvious good faith, but lacking, by reason of the donor's natural ignorance of

the law, the technical requisite of a delivery.
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urged in opposition to the historical school's contention that delivery is
but a remnant of a primitive period in our jurisprudence. Supporters of
the functional approach contend that as far back as Bracton it has been
recognized that delivery is the natural mode of making a gift.13 However, the validity of such a view is disputed by the very fact that so many
gifts flounder on the delivery requirement. Assuming arguendo that
an overt act of giving is a natural or "normal" method of making a gift,
it does not necessarily follow that a layman would be led intuitively to
the intricacies and nuances of delivery as presently defined and applied.
The need for some overt act manifesting the donor's intent to then and
there make a gift probably approximates the layman's understanding,
more so than does the assumption that he is attuned to the existing complexities in this area. The fact that the various states differ in their interpretation of delivery and the further fact that within any particular
jurisdiction the concept will be applied in an uneven, splintered fashion
also militates against acceptance of such a view.
Approaching the "law for the layman" versus "everyone is presumed to know the law" dichotomy from another vantage point, consideration should be given to the fact that the social and legal device
known as the gift is here to stay, being too deeply rooted to be legislated
out of existence. The utterance of this truism might appear ludicrous;
no one has advanced the notion of abolishing gifts as such. However,
the observation takes on meaning when one recalls that proposals have
frequently been made relating to the demise of the gift causa mortis or
death-bed gifts generally. And, as previously noted, impending death
has supplied, and in all likelihood will continue to supply, both the principal motive and occasion for donations. Would legislation aimed at
elimination of such transfers be advisable as a policy matter, if, as indicated, it would go contrary to custom, human nature or both? Assuming that a negative answer is forthcoming, one is led to the further question of whether existing delivery standards should be perpetuated when
they appear to needlessly defeat such transactions, while serving no worthwhile purpose which cannot be achieved more economically by other
means. The demonstrated ability of evidentiary norms to sift out fraudulent claims in all other civil cases, and the valuable ends subserved by upholding transfers of this nature, would appear to dictate that seeds of
destruction should not be sown into the very definition of a gift if it is
to be continued as a sanctioned method of effectuating succession. In
the language of Gulliver and Tilson, "any requirement of transfer should
33. See, e.g., Cochrane v. Moore (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 57; Mechem 345-48 (contrast
the cited material with the passage quoted in the previous footnote).
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have a clearly demonstrable affirmative value since it always presents
the possibility of invalidating perfectly genuine and equitable transfers
that fail to comply with it." 4
Nor do the functional aspects of delivery present obstacles to the
transition sought. It has yet to be clearly demonstrated that the cautionary function has any real significance in the gift area."3 Although
there is much to be said for freedom of exploratory negotiations in contractual bargaining, the courts and commentators agree that the donor
typically does not part with his worldly goods until the last breath is
drawing near. It would appear that this fact would, without more, insure that caution and solemnity abound. A realistic view of the situation would appear to require a conclusion that the donor is not so much
in need of protection from himself as he is in need of judicial assistance
in securing his expressed desires regarding his property. Another indication that the incautious donor problem may be more imaginary than
real may be found in the fact that, even in the inter vivos area, remarkably few of the cases involve recalcitrant donors brought into court by
disappointed donees. The very human factors which prompt a gift will
usually support an amicable retraction. Lastly, the cautionary barrier,
whatever its utility or lack thereof, would still be present if, as suggested,
an overt act was required to accompany the expression of donative intent. The availability of the causa mortis vehicle, and its frequent employment, would appear to supply an additional safety valve against premature divestment of one's assets.
With respect to the evidentiary function, it may be noted that many
of the observations made in connection with the fraud prevention role
may be applied to the evidentiary function with equal validity. There is
no inherent relationship between fraud and manual tradition or its substitutes which would indicate that the two cannot co-exist or that a genuine gift cannot be had without a delivery."8 Proponents of the evidentiary
function indicate that delivery may be dispensed with in situations where34. Gulliver & Tilson 9.
35. See Williston, Gifts of Rights Under Contracts in, Writing By Delivery of the
Writing, 40 YALE L.J. 1, 9-14 (1930), wherein Professor Williston champions dominion
and control as the key inquiry, while downgrading the cautionary function.
36. Presumably the legislature of any given state could draft a statute setting
down requirements for a valid gift without, of necessity, having to include delivery.
It is interesting to note that a controversy has flared up from time to time as to
whether delivery is an operative fact in the inter vivos gift area but a mere evidentiary
fact in the causa mortis area (making possible a relaxation of the strict application
of delivery in the latter area but not in the former). See Barlow, Gift Inter Vivos of
Chose in, Possession by Delivery of a Key, 19 MODERN L. REv. 394 (1956); Murray,
Gifts-Donatio Mortis Causa, 31 CAN. B. Ray. 935 (1953); Pound, Juristic Science
and Law, 31 HARv. L. REv. 1047 (1918); Comment, The Theory of Delivery in Gifts
Causa Mortis, 39 Ky. L.J. 215 (1951) ; Note, 59 U. PA. L. REv. 95 (1910).
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in caution and genuineness are secured by other means. Hence it would
appear that the evidentiary value of delivery cannot be equated with the
stand that it is for some unexplained reason essential or part and parcel
of the very structure of a gift. The farthest most advocates of the
evidentiary function have gone is to state that delivery is of unique qualitative value as evidence in that it indicates the presence of the desired
high degree of reflection and volition on the part of the donor." However, this approach would seem to resolve itself into the cautionary
function previously discussed.
Even if it is assumed that this position represents a consideration
separate and apart from the cautionary concern, it may well be questioned whether delivery is of unique value as evidence. At one time
manual tradition and/or possession of the object by the alleged donee
after the death of the owner might have been highly probative, if not the
best evidence that a gift had been made. However, several developments
have combined to lessen the significance of the foregoing factors so that
a presumed delivery currently offers only one of many plausible explanations for these facts. Modem mobility of both persons and property, ownership of dispersed assets, and the widespread practice of entrusting others with choses in action, documents, registrations, and personal property of appreciable value, for purposes wholly unconnected with
a gift, must be considered. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the practice of many individuals of permitting acquaintances to
utilize their automobiles almost at will. When such bailments are frequent or for an extended period, such as for use on a trip or vacation, it
is not uncommon to entrust the registration to the bailee as well. Faced
with this fact of life, the courts have exhibited an understandable reluctance to find that a gift has taken place even where the alleged donee
is in possession of the vehicle itself, the keys to the auto and garage, the
registration, or some combination of these elements." Ironically enough,
it may well be that in any given instance preoccupation with the fact
that a manual tradition has taken place, or with the fact that the alleged
donee is in possession of the object after the death of the owner, may
lead to a relaxation of vigilance with respect to possible fraud. The
stress placed upon the evidentiary function by the authors cited earlier
37. See, note 19 supra. Most decisions, however, at least since Irons v. Smallplece,
2 B. & Aid. 551, 106 Eng. Rep. 467 (1819) have regarded delivery as an operative fact.
38. See, e.g., Taylor v. Burdick, 320 Mich. 25, 30 N.W.2d 418 (1948), 47 MicH. L.
REv. 427 (1949); In re Spingarn's Estate, 111 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1952)
(not otherwise reported) ; Matter of Calen, 142 Misc. 363, 255 N. Y. Supp. 383 (Surr.
Ct. Oneida Co. 1932). See also Comment, Statutory Treatment of the Requirement
of DeHvery in Gifts of Personal Property, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 571 (1961).
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may also be discounted to the extent that they presume ideal conditions,
such as the presence of disinterested third party witnesses at the moment
of transfer. The simple fact is that many of the litigated gift transactions take place under less than ideal conditions, and if proof of genuineness becomes the focal point, would not the witnesses themselves provide
that, with or without a delivery having taken place. In light of the foregoing, it would appear that adequate proof of a gift can be supplied,
with no appreciable loss in efficiency, by shifting to the less stringent
demand for proof of an overt act of giving.
Finally, whether delivery may be justified on the ground that it provides a channel for the legally effective expression of donative intent
may well be doubted in view of the fact that, more often than not, it
appears to represent an obstacle to, rather than a well worn groove for,
the accomplishment of the donor's manifest objectives. Can the formal
requirement of delivery serve a channeling function if the user is by and
large unaware of the fact that it is the only channel to the desired end
and presumes that any overt manifestation will suffice? If this function
is to be accomplished, it would appear that knowledge of its essential
nature and what is required to constitute an effective delivery would
have to be much more widespread than it is at present. Presumptions
relating to knowledge of the law can have no application in refutation of
this criticism, unless one is to take the position that the channeling function is limited to providing assistance for those who are sufficiently
versed in the law as to have no real need for a channel, namely the lawyer
and the judge.
It is also doubtful whether the norms of manual tradition of the
object or possession in the donee are sufficiently flexible to cover today's
needs. In the past century the chose in action has surpassed the chose in
possession as the chief source of wealth and, as a consequence, the concept of ownership has moved farther and farther away from the connotation of physical control over, or possession of, the corporeal asset.3"
The rules relating to change of ownership, including gifts, of choses in
action have been merging with those governing tangible assets, largely
due to the commercial practice of personifying or identifying the chose
with the document representing it, as for example the bank book or
39.

Williston, supra note 35, at 12:

Choses in action now constitute by far the greatest part of the property of
most persons of means. Not only is property intangible in its origin included
within the category, but a large part of the tangible property in the country is
now subjected to the law governing choses in action by the use of mortgages
and corporate sharea of stock. Gifts of choses in action therefore involve far
more serious questions than gifts of chattels.
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stock certificate. As these developments continue, methods of transferring the chose multiply and diversify. The same can be said for corporeal assets, such as the automobile, which can now be transferred
through bills of sale, transfer of registrations, etc., separate and apart
from any tradition of the asset itself. The varied factual situations
which may give rise to the gift and the multiplication of indicia of ownership indicate that the day is past when the notion of a singular method
of transfer will suffice.4" The relaxation of the delivery norm here
sought would also have the virtue of encompassing within it the presently accepted method of effectuating a gift-manual tradition-thereby
providing a sure route for those cautious enough to seek out the time
tested path.
CONCLUSION

It would appear that the litigated gift cases center around the act
of the would-be donor in disposing of some or all of his assets on impending death and that the courts therefore have a legitimate and continuing concern with fraud prevention. Nevertheless, where the possibility
of fraud has been ruled out by the evidence and the donee's burden carried in all other respects, no justification can be found for an overlystrict interpretation and application of the delivery concept. In the past
the courts appear to have relied upon strict interpretation as an aid to
evidentiary norms in screening out fraudulent claims, at the cost of
needlessly nullifying a number of proven and meritorious transactions.
An element of inconsistency has thereby been introduced in that deathbed gifts have been treated as testamentary for purposes of proof, while
the canons of construction ordinarily applicable to the interpretation of
a decedent's directions have invariably been ignored. It is to be hoped
that isolation of the fraud prevention function may some day be had,
thereby removing its unconscious influence on interpretation of the legal
and factual issues presented.
At one time a case-law rule, once crystallized, was beyond the pale
of judicial modification, in the view of most jurists, having passed into
the exclusive domain of the legislature. Recent inroads in the area of
privity of contract in breach of warranty cases, charitable immunity
from tort liability, and other common law propositions encrusted with
age, indicate that a broader conception of judicial power, and indeed responsibility, to revise principles of case-law origin is taking root. Hence
40. At least one commentator has raised the possibility of eventual abolition of
both actual and constructive delivery requirements. See Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery i; Makin9 Gifts, 32 W. VA. L. REv. 313 (1926).
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it may be that a change in perspective in the gift area, as well as in other
areas of private law which stand in need of modernization, may make
feasible judicial correction which might not have been possible only a
decade ago. Attorneys in several states have recently been extricated
from the snares for the unwary contained in the rule against perpetuities
by sweeping changes which have liberalized and simplified the pertinent
rules. Should not this beneficence be shared with the layman donor in
the form of a reprieve from the traps for the unsuspecting contained in
the delivery maze?

